In a 3 week operation by the MOM in 2015, 191 out of 214 (i.e. 89%) construction sites inspected violated workplace safety rules. Six worksites were issued with Stop Work Orders (SWO). Fines totalling S$156,000 were handed out and 272 Notices of Non-Compliance (NNCs) were issued². Stop Work Orders (SWO), which are legal demands issued by MOM to suspend work, are the most common tool deployed by the MOM in the event of a major safety infraction, especially fatalities. They require the company subject to a SWO to cease all work except for actions to correct the situation.

Unlike the Safety Time Out (STO)³, SWOs are issued to specific contractors at active worksites and represent more of a reactive measure. While on the surface the issuance of an SWO might seem adequately productive—at least in the short term—they can worsen safety risks overall. There is a vicious cycle at play because measures put in place by the MOM inadvertently create more cost-pressures and safety risks in workplace practices. 

Take for example:

1. A workplace fatality occurs due to poor safety standards. A Workplace Safety and Health Institute (WSHI) study in 2016 showed that 9 in 10 deaths were a result of companies failing to manage risks—“some cut corners by neglecting to do risk assessments or withholding lifelines for workers’ safety harnesses.”⁴

2. The MOM issues a Stop Work Order. Contractors are obligated to suspend all work for a minimum of 3 weeks but continue to pay worker’s salaries and comply with the original project deadline. According to the article which outlined the WSHI study (see previous footnote) this allegedly drives up costs, especially when they are fined for missing deadlines by the developers who contract them.

3. When the order is lifted and work restarts, workers end up operating under more pressure than before. A contractor still rushing to meet the original deadlines after work has been stopped, and now also fighting against higher costs, may then further undermine safety by making workers work over time, take on multiple roles, or turn a blind eye to important processes that slow work down e.g. worksite traffic management. In the same article, contractors referred to this industry as “cut-throat”, but for an industry driven by growth and profit, it is workers who end up the most vulnerable in a city that is constantly building.

A construction project typically involves a main developer (who gets land and relevant permits, finances deals, oversees other actors) and many contractors (e.g. to do excavation, or furnishing, or wiring). Where a SWO is issued to a contractor, their project deadlines under their agreement with the developer—often government or government-linked bodies—don't change and they bear the risk of penalties if they don't meet the deadlines.

This makes no sense. If the intention of MOM's SWO should be to recalibrate a worksite and reinforce safety, it's counterproductive for it to also create conditions that compel contractors to subject their workers to other forms of precarity. Given that the biggest developer in Singapore is the government and its linked companies—Land Transport Authority (LTA), Public Utilities Board (PUB), Housing Development Board (HDB), Surbana Jurong—it raises questions as to the coherence of government policies about workplace safety. 

The Human Costs of a Stop Work Order (SWO)

When we think of the term "business as usual", we think of a mundane, passive position. When an accident occurs, perhaps a news headline may appear, an industry-wide circular might be sent out, a politician might express regrets; but outside of that, things simply carry on as they were. By and large this is true, because migrant worker deaths have been enveloped into the ubiquity of the everyday. 

But this passivity—even as it is a form of violence—belies the “business as usual” industry. In some instances, these accidents are a result of active, blatant disregard as in the case of Or Kim Peow (OKP) Holdings Ltd, who were re-awarded bids and projects despite having violated safety protocols and/or had workers die on their watch. In many ways, this is the usual business—putting migrant lives at stake for profit.

Two workers on our sheet, an unnamed Indian male and a Chinese worker, Chen Yinchuan, lost their lives at two separate worksites managed by OKP Contractors. Below is a timeline illustrating these deaths and the circumstances surrounding them.

Business as Usual

Download a PDF of this timeline & view the sources we used here. 

What is significant to note in this timeline is how the $96.4 million contract for the PIE viaduct was awarded while investigations following the first accident—which resulted in a death and 3 injuries—were still ongoing. 

The investigation eventually found that OKP had failed to ensure that the platform erected was safe for use, or to train the workers involved. But by the time this investigation concluded, they had already won a new project bid, which would later result in another death and 10 injuries. 

The Land Transport Authority (LTA) does not bar contractors which have had safety lapses or been blacklisted by the MOM from participating in tenders⁶. According to Senior Minister of State for Transport Dr Lam Pin Min, “MOM’s investigations (of the 2015 accident) were still ongoing at the time LTA was evaluating OKP’s bid for the construction of this viaduct in question, and hence, LTA did not disqualify OKP outright. Nevertheless, LTA gave OKP a low safety performance score in the evaluation of its bid. On the other hand, OKP offered the lowest tender price and also had a good track record in completing many similar infrastructural projects over the past 10 years. Overall, it obtained the highest (price-quality) score and was awarded the project.” ⁷

Dr Lam revealed that bids for the PIE viaduct project were assessed by a breakdown of 70% price and 30% quality component. Out of the quality component, LTA assigned 25% to safety (7.5% of the entire score). He noted that OKP "actually scored the lowest for quality in the project submission". Despite the two-envelope system⁸—which is supposed to prioritise quality over value—public projects still tend to be awarded to the lowest bidder.

The fact that a company can bid for—and win—a tender for a project while being investigated for a death on a separate worksite is a clear example of a system that has not sufficiently valued the lives of workers.

As in the case of OKP, oftentimes it is people who make workplaces unsafe—and this extends to those who allow individuals to continue business operations despite obvious violations.

Contractors often complain that the pressure of keeping their tender prices low to win contracts means they have little funds left over to pay for proper safety equipment and personnel.

Yet, in the Financial Year of 2017, the same year of the second accident, OKP Holdings Limited announced a net profit attributable to equity holders of S$12.7 million, while revenue rose by 5.6% to S$117.3 million for the full year. In 2021, OKP was fined $1 million for the PIE viaduct accident, but as at 31 Dec 2020, their net construction order book stood at $245 million, with projects extending to 2023. Their books also revealed that they had earned a profit of $3.3 million in the financial year ending 2020.

All of these workers deaths were preventable, but they have been subsumed under the dominant narratives of ‘rare, errant employers’ or ‘construction work is inherently dangerous’. Public and political discourse on workplace safety has the tendency of displacing the responsibility on workers to ensure accidents do not happen—some taglines that have often been paraded in safety campaigns include: “Say No To Risks” or “Don’t Laze. Be Safe.” 

This is a passive position to take; it suggests that we are all victims of an industry and way of life that is fatal. But when we dig deeper into these cases we find that sheer neglect, irresponsibility, and companies' access to projects/tenders despite a record of endangering them are the leading causes of death. Of the 20 fatal cases in 2022 (correct as of July 2022), it is very concerning that seven of them were similar in nature to cases that occurred in 2021: three cases involved forklifts, two involved falls from ladders, and two involved falls through fragile surfaces. Preliminary investigations revealed that a common factor among these fatalities was that basic safety and health control measures—such as wearing of seat belts in forklifts, or fall protection gear while working at heights—were either inadequate or not in place at all⁹. 

Apparent passivity and complicity in these tragedies—a comfortable position for people in power to occupy—is actually active involvement in the deaths of a vulnerable population. These people who release financial reports and break symbolic ground at worksites for photo opportunities are the same people who have the power to change the way work is carried out in this country. 

Instead of Safety Time-Outs and temporary blacklists, what we need is an overall transformation of the safety structures in Singapore’s construction industry. Every life is invaluable. To put our money where our mouth is, the margins of a bid should not ever outweigh the importance of safety.

Transient Workers Count Too (TWC2) has repeatedly highlighted the need to increase the weightage of safety in the tendering process. There was only a 2 month gap between OKP’s first accident in 2015, and their winning bid for the PIE project in 2017. Bids should not be able to fall below a certain cost, especially if safety scores are low. There also has to be a minimum score that companies must have consistently met within a certain number of years for them to be able to place bids. 

De-centering the culture of cost-saving and profit-maximising is an important first step. We’re a nation that is constantly building, upgrading, refurbishing, and reclaiming; the compromises and cost-cutting measures imposed on safety in order to stretch our dollar is unacceptable. A total of 45 stop-work orders have been issued between 1 Jan to 1 June 2022. That means close to 2 unsafe workplaces are reported every week, and if we recall what happened with OKP, not all unsafe workplaces are reported and some remain unsafe even after these orders have been lifted. 

What happens when we put profit over people? The Marina Bay Sands Project—which was lauded for being completed in just 5 years and adding $2.7 billion to Singapore’s annual GDP—routinely made the workers who built it pull overnight shifts. According to HOME, “eleven to thirteen hour shifts were common. Sometimes they [workers] even had to work overnight in order to meet the tight deadlines imposed by their employers.”¹⁰ We were only able to find reports of two deaths at the MBS project: Ji Shi Biau and Xie Xu Han, but we suspect there may be more because the project spanned five years and the conditions were reported to be hazardous. 

Baseline Provisions: What Do We Need?

Despite the presence of safety banners telling workers they have the right to refuse unsafe work, whistleblowing almost always falls on deaf ears or ends up being dangerous for the worker refusing work or making a complaint. In the case of OKP’s 2017 accident, workers discovered cracks on the corbels one month prior, two weeks prior, and less than an hour prior to the final accident. These cracks were reported to superiors but OKP did not inform LTA about any of the cracks. The whistleblowing by workers was ignored, ultimately leading to lives being put at stake. In other instances, workers who report safety lapses or unethical practices—especially to the MOM directly—often have their work passes cancelled and are repatriated before formal investigations can begin. 

We spoke to a worker from a different company who was made to scale a platform of higher than 2 metres without a helmet and/or safety harness to carry out a painting job (see the image below: this is illegal, and he was also not trained to do this job). When he filed a complaint with the MOM, their preliminary investigations revealed his identity to his employer, who proceeded to verbally and physically abuse him, and then cancel his work pass. Beside the image is a voice recording from this worker, A, detailing his experience.

The Dangers of Whistleblowing

To report or not to report will remain a violent catch-22 for as long as there are no safe avenues for workers to blow the whistle on unsafe workplaces.

Are workers able to seek recourse if they spot/experience safety lapses? What is the purpose of workplace safety banners? How is the mental health of migrant workers relevant to the issue of workplace safety? To better understand the predicament of workplace safety in our construction sites, we interviewed a migrant worker who works as Safety Coordinator in Singapore. As you’ll hear in this conversation, we discuss formal safety processes, the reasons behind the escalating numbers of workplace accidents in 2022, and a worker’s personal feelings towards the current state of workplace safety.